Marginalized as a non-Jewish minority and suspected as a potential fifth column, the presence of a sizable, indigenous Palestinian Arab national minority has posed an implicit, and sometimes also an explicit, counter-hegemonic challenge not only to the ideological concept of a Jewish state but to the future maintenance of a Jewish demographic majority within it.
It was within this atmosphere of fear and suspicion that the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel was subjected to eighteen years of harsh military rule (Peleg 2004: 417) . Already weakened by a war which saw them significantly reduced in number and disconnected from each other in three main Arab enclaves in Israel (the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev) -and without any form of political, intellectual, economic or cultural leadership to guide or represent their interests -military rule imposed tight controls which further restricted their ability to move, work, organize and speak freely. In addition to physical containment, political surveillance and censorship, military rule allowed the wide-scale expropriation of Arab lands by the state and its agencies, thereby facilitating Jewish settlement and undermining what were perceived to be residual Arab strongholds in the country (Jiryis 1968; Jamal 2009b: 29-32) .
One of the first to focus on the discriminatory and instrumental nature of Israeli state policy towards the Palestinian Arab minority, and its broader impact upon stateminority relations in Israel, was Sammy Smooha. In his 1978 study, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, Smooha argued that the Israeli authorities were interested in engineering the 'pacification' of the minority through a combination of carrot-and-stick initiatives, whereby the 'carrot' of voluntary 'compliance' was understood to be based on recognition of the obvious benefits, incentives and rewards available to them as citizens of the state, and the 'stick' was based on their forced 'economic dependence' on, and 'political subordination' to, the Jewish majority (Smooha 1978: 45-46) .
Critically, Smooha made a radical departure from earlier and more traditional analyses of Israel as a liberal democracy by suggesting that Israel's policy towards its Palestinian Arab minority could, cumulatively speaking, be understood as 'an effective machinoy of control-exclusion, dependence and subordination' (Smooha 1978: 45) . This he developed through his understanding of Israel as an 'ethnic democracy' (Smooha 1997: 199-200) .
While Smooha led the way in challenging the hegemonic, or pro-establishment, Israeli academic view of the state as a 'normal' democracy, he nonetheless maintained that Israel is basically more democratic than ethnic in nature. This conclusion was, however, rigorously challenged by other Israeli academics, such as Oren Yiftachel, As'ad Ghanem and Nadim Rouhana, who argued that the presence of democratic features alone represents an insufficient criterion for defining Israel as a democratic state (Ghanem et al. 1998: 254) . Having identified a basic dissonance between the concepts of 'democracy' and 'ethnicity', they argued that given the contradiction between democratic and ethnic principles and interests, an asymmetrical relationship, or hierarchy, exists between them, with the ethnic nature of the state dominating, or subordinating, the democratic strand when the two collide.
Of the features that characterize ethnocratic regimes and that distinguish them from other forms of governance, Yiftachel stressed that not only is ethnicity the overriding determinant of rights and privileges in an ethnocratic state, but that the 'charter' group, which Smooha refers to as the 'core ethnic nation', 'appropriates the state apparatus, determines most public policies, and segregates itself from other groups' (Yiftachel 1999b: 367-68) . In addition to the institutional segregation and stratification of ethnic groups in society, ethnocratic regimes legitimize themselves not only through a supportive 'cultural and ideological apparatus' but also through the maintenance of 'selective openness', which, in turn, facilitates the operation of a complex and extensive system of control (Yiftachel 1999b: 367-68 ).
Yiftachel has primarily tested his understanding of Israel as an ethnocratic regime through several studies examining the discriminatory nature of the state's land policies, particularly with regard to urban planning, settlement and zoning strategies (Yiftachel 1995 (Yiftachel , 1999a (Yiftachel and 1999b Lustick was interested in exploring the 'seeming docility' of the Palestinian Arab minority and why 'Arab discontent' with discriminatory policies had not led to either an outbreak of ethnic conflict in society or to their political mobilization (Lustick 1980: 8, 15, 24) . Lustick concluded that the reasons lay in 'the presence of a highly effective system of control which, since 1948, has operated over Israeli Arabs' (Lustick 1980: 25) . Observing a highly sophisticated and predominantly extralegal system of control which operated alongside, but not subordinate to, official proclamations, declarations, laws and policies of the state, Lustick identified three main components or 'functional requisites' which define the Israeli control system: segmentation, dependence and co-optation which were reinforced and operationalized through structural, institutional and programmatic dimensions of power (Lustick: 1980: 77) .
Seen cumulatively, Israel's system of control is understood to be based on the 'network of mutually reinforcing relations which has emerged from these structural, institutional and programmatic patterns' and the 'reciprocal interdependencies' which have been forged between them based upon each separate level of analysis (Lustick 1980: 77-78) . While Lustick's systemic approach highlighted the complex, dialectical and evolving nature of control, as well as the capacity of the overall system of control to change and adapt itself over time in line with new circumstances and realities, the relevance of his approach to current understandings of state policy towards the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel has been weakened by two main factors.
The first factor concerns the temporal limits of his research and how he anticipated various 'challenges to the system' would ultimately become reconciled within it. (Lustick 1980: 232-50) . Faced with growing challenges to its control system, Lustick forecast three different possible regime responses: 'system adaptation, breakdown or transformation'. Given the concomitant strengthening of democratic forces within society, and the emergence of important Israeli Jewish circles which were critical of the state and its policy towards the minority, Lustick and others forecast that the Israeli system of control was coming to an end (Lustick 1980: 252-65) . This optimistic assumption undermined his previous understanding of the dialectical and dynamic nature of control in maintaining stability in deeply divided societies. It also overlooked the structural potential for a sophistication of control in line with changing circumstances and realities over time. The go-to scholar on Palestinian Arab media in Israel, Amal Jamal, has also thrown important light on the 'structural opportunities' provided by the globalization of mass media to minorities 'to overcome state control and surveillance policies and develop counter-hegemonic public spheres that meet the needs, interests and aspirations of the minority' (Jamal 2009b: 1-2). Jamal's work is, however, primarily concerned with the consumption of Palestinian Arab media by the minority itself. While identifying Israel to be a 'nationalizing state' that is based on a hegemonic 'core nation' (Jamal 2009b: 23-24), Jamal fails to address either the impact of the minority's counter-hegemonic discourse upon state hegemony or the response of a 'nationalizing state' such as Israel to the minority's counter-hegemonic discourse. By choosing to focus on Palestinian Arab media in isolation from its wider structural context, the dialectical nature of the relationship between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces in Israel is minimized, as is the capacity for understanding changes to the systemic nature of state control over time.
This article will contribute to the existing literature by charting state responses to the development of counter-hegemonic Palestinian media over time and analysing the impact that these responses have had on the systemic nature of ethnocratic control in Israel today.
The evolution of Palestinian Arab media in Israel
The most widely distributed newspapers at the turn of the twentieth century were , al-Karmel, al-Difa'a and al-Mufid (Jamal 2009a: 562; Jamal 2009b: 40) .
Filisteen
While readership of these newspapers remained restricted to the Palestinian elites -a trend caused by large gaps in education, literacy and general socio-economic standards between different segments of the population -their existence played an important part in a broader process of political development that saw the emergence of modern Palestinian national consciousness as a distinct communal and political identity in the region (Khalidi 1997: 42) . (Kaufman 1997: 26-28) .
Until the early 1980s, al-Ittihad dominated the Arabic print press scene in Israel and became not only the principal 'Arab national newspaper for Insider Arabs' but was also considered to be the 'authentic representative' of Arab national views in Israel (Koren 2003: 215-16 ).
Given the absence of competition, al-Ittihad was in the paradoxical position of being both counter-hegemonic and hegemonic at the same time. As one of the few opposition newspapers (and the only Arabic newspaper) allowed to legally operate in Israel, it had exclusive and, for several decades, unrivalled dominance in the Palestinian Arab media sector. It was the only newspaper in Israel, or the Middle East for that matter, to provide critical coverage of issues relating specifically to local and national Palestinian Arab affairs, which it did from its own political perspective. As the dominant voice of dissent within the minority, it provided a showcase for several renowned Palestinian writers and poets, including Emil Habibi, Emil Touma, Hana Ibrahim, Tawfiq Ziad, Samih al-Qasim and Mahmoud Darwish.
The ethnic make-up of its editorial ranks, together with its clear political and counterhegemonic attitude towards the authorities, galvanized the negative reputation that it had with an Israeli establishment, which saw it as a tool of political radicalization and extremism within the minority. Due to its important communicative and representative function on behalf of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel -and for a certain period on behalf of the Palestinian population of the West Bank also -the authorities employed a number of different carrot-and-stick measures to limit or offset its counter-hegemonic capacity.
The strategies adopted to counteract the influence of al-Ittihad varied, but initially followed a crude and unsophisticated format. Following the establishment of the state, the newly created Ministry of the Interior ordered the office of the newspaper to be closed for a brief period and in May 1952 the newspaper's office was once again closed by the authorities (Stendel 1996: 213-14) . In both cases, closure was justified by the authorities on 'security' grounds. The closure of 1952, for instance, followed an article which al-Ittihad published criticizing the government's position on the Korean War. The article -which was originally run in its Hebrew-language counterpart (Kol Ha-Am) -resulted in both newspapers being closed for fifteen days on the grounds that they were 'endangering public safety' (Stendel 1996: 213-14) . (Yu and Cohen 2009: 191) . Unlike alYawm, however, al-Anbaa was primarily focused on Palestinian readers in the OPTs, and while it attempted to offer a more conciliatory tone to the minority by allowing some space for criticism of state policies within its pages, it ultimately failed to attract readers and was closed in 1984 (Jamal 2009b: 46) . within the framework of its own political opposition. As a publication affiliated with a Zionist party, however, its ability to reflect the national and political sentiment of the minority was constrained and, as a result of a diminishing volume of readers and growing financial concerns, the newspaper was finally closed in 1976 (Magal 2010: 115-16 ).
The crude control strategies of closure and the more sophisticated control measures of state propaganda were unable to bring about the type of long-term results desired by the state, namely the promotion of an accommodationist and quietist Arab minority in Israel that would forego its national identity and rights and accept the political status quo of an ethnocratic state dominated by its Jewish 'core nation'. For some analysts, this illustrated the resilient and effective nature of Palestinian Arab counterhegemonic strategies and the gradual democratization of state policies towards the minority. Such accounts, however, overlook two things. The first is that closures continued to take place, albeit sporadically, in later years despite the increased democratic openness of society (Ghanem 1998: 437) . Such closures, as will be shown later on, were justified according to the traditional terminology of 'security', thus contradicting or at the very least undermining the notion of a linear pattern of policy development. The second dimension, which is often overlooked in analyses that centralize the democratizing nature of Israeli policy over time is the resilient and adaptive nature of an ethnocratic state and its ability to respond to and deal with challenges to its hegemony from within. The decreasing significance of crude and direct control strategies did not signify an end to state control. While certain measures were largely abandoned, other more sophisticated, selective and indirect control strategies were gradually introduced over time, which limited the capacity of the minority's counter-hegemonic discourse to upset the political status quo in a more efficient and effective way.
One area which illustrates the development of a system of control that is based on more sophisticated, selective and indirect measures is the Israeli legal system. While Israel. Taking a more overtly nationalistic stand than the Communist Party on issues relating to the minority, al-Ard publications succeeded in attracting Arab journalists and readers alike who were disenchanted with both the state and with the narrow political interests expressed in al-Ittihad. From the outset, the authorities viewed the al-Ard movement as a distinct and radical threat. Despite several appeals to the Supreme Court, the movement was refused a legal permit to register itself as a party and, as a result, they were also denied a legal permit to publish. In an attempt to defy the state's ruling, al-Ard publications were distributed illegally. Demonstrating, however, the practical and economic pressures and obstacles which result from the lack of legal recognition, such publications could only be issued irregularly. Aware that the absence of legal recognition jeopardized their ability to survive politically, the movement sought to challenge the state by lobbying its case internationally. This media-based counter-move, however, did not succeed. In 1964, the Supreme Court declared the movement illegal and three of the movement's leaders were arrested (Zureik 1979: 172-74; Jamal 2009b: 49-50) . The Court's decision to make the al-Ard movement illegal was justified in the Israeli press in national hegemonic terms for 'ignoring the will of the Jewish majority in Israel as well as the State's authorities' (Zureik 1979: 174) , which illustrates the growing confidence of the establishment to protect the ethnic nature of the state, even when such decisions contradict democratic norms and expectations. The negative attitude of the authorities towards the Communist Party (Rakah) and alIttihad was exposed in a confidential and internal ministerial memorandum that was leaked to the Israeli press in September 1976. The leaked report, known as the Koenig Report, was written just one month prior to the Land Day strikes and laid bare the attitude of the authorities towards the party and the minority as a whole, and made a range of policy recommendations to contain and control them (MERIP 1976: 12) .
Although the Koenig Report confirmed many of the suspicions of the minority regarding the state's attitudes and intentions towards it, many of the policy recommendations that it put forward had, by that time, become increasingly impractical to implement. This is not to suggest that they were totally abandoned. In
1988, for instance, Israeli Prime Minister and acting Minister of the Interior, Yitzhak
Shamir, ordered the offices of al-Ittihad closed for six days 'as he was convinced that it was a factor inciting public riots along with the anticipated demonstrations' of the minority in the run up to the Land Day commemorations and against the backdrop of the first intifada which had commenced the year beforehand (Stendel 1996: 217) . But from the late 1970s, and particularly from the 1980s, new obstacles to control emerged in Israel which followed processes of change in local politics, on the one hand, and transformations of Israeli media law, on the other, and which necessitated changes in the level and nature of engagement by the authorities. It has already been observed that the emergence of a new dominant generation of commercial press came directly at the expense of politically affiliated newspapers.
This shifting dynamic, however, has had critically important consequences not only for the content of newspapers, but for their perceived level of threat by the authorities.
As Jamal has noted, newspapers such as as-Sinaara 'have introduced a new school of journalism that is not politically or ideologically committed but is motivated by profit' (Jamal 2009b: 66) . These profit-driven newspapers that minimize or steer clear of overtly political content in order to capture the widest demographic of Arabic readers possible are 'more commercial than informative' in nature (Jamal 2009b: 68) . In order to satisfy the need for profit, these newspapers have created new patterns of Arabic media production and consumption that represent less, rather than more, of a 'threat' to the state.
While the marginalization of political content within Arabic print press in Israel is in large part due to the commercial interests of the newspapers themselves, it is also determined to a significant degree by structural disparities in the media landscape that have been emphasized, rather than overcome, by technological changes and that have Jamal's analysis of patterns of media consumption reveals that Palestinian media are not the main go-to source for 'hard' news in Israel. The vast majority of Palestinians in Israel (81.7 per cent) switch on their televisions and tune into al-Jazeera and Channel 2 to receive the latest news (Jamal 2009b: 112-15) . This pattern of media consumption is underscored by the fact that the three most popular Arabic newspapers in Israel today are not daily, but rather weekly newspapers. Only 9.3 per cent of the Palestinians he surveyed read Palestinian Arabic newspapers on a daily basis (Jamal 2009b: 74) . This has increased the dependence of Palestinian Arabs on external media sources which has, in turn, aggravated the marginality and underdevelopment of replacing it with either a secular or consociational democracy (Rekhess 2007: 17) .
Given that important sections of Israeli Jewish society saw in these documents 'a declaration of war' (Rekhess 2007: 20) , it is hardly surprising that PINGOs have since come to be viewed with a heightened sense of mistrust and prejudice. The state has employed a range of measures to offset or limit the counter-hegemonic potential of PINGOs. Of these, legislation remains a major avenue through which this is accomplished. The power to extend, deny or remove legal recognition of associations that are deemed to contradict or challenge the Jewish ethnic nature of the state increases the power of the state and the dependency of PINGOs upon it (Payes 2003: 63) . The 1964 decision to outlaw the al-Ard movement established a precedent for exclusion through legal means. With the introduction of the 1980 Law, however, the legal options to exclude Palestinian associations were expanded. It was now, for instance, possible to outlaw any Israeli organization with the word 'Palestinian' in its name as this would 'be offensive to public feeling' (Payes 2003: 67-68) .
Another increasingly common strategy that has been employed by the state is the targeting of individual PINGO leaders and activists. The 'personification of institutions and leadership roles' which Jamal has observed to be a widespread phenomenon in the Middle East (Jamal 2006: 16-17) illustrate not only the growing tension between democratic opportunities and ethnocratic controls but, cumulatively, the continued dynamic range of mechanisms available to ethnocratic states in responding to counter-hegemonic challenges.
Conclusion
Through an integrated assessment of ethnocratic theory and state policy towards Palestinian Arab media in Israel, this article has demonstrated the resilient, dynamic and reflexive nature of the Israeli system of control in responding to Palestinian counter-hegemonic challenges through the media. Through a wide range of legal and extralegal, sophisticated and crude as well as direct and indirect strategies, the State of Israel has, thus far, been able to successfully mitigate the democratically available channels of protest that have been employed by the Palestinian Arab minority to challenge its unequal status in society and push for political reform of the system. The future sustainability of ethnocratic controls, however, is not guaranteed. Engaged in a constant struggle between ethnic and democratic tensions, as well as between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces, the future stability of the Israeli system of control ultimately depends upon the continued broad level of support and consensus that it currently derives from the Jewish majority.
